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Abstract
The past two decades in the United States have ushered in an era of increasing ubiquity of digitized healthcare
as the speed and sophistication of technology follows an ever-growing trend. Electronic health records (EHRs)
are an integral part of the growing healthcare industry which offers ease of access and new functionality while
simultaneously causing worries over their privacy and security. In an effort to address these concerns, much
legislation has been enacted in order to tighten the oversight and requirements for accessing protected health
information (PHI). Most recently, the Department of Health and Human Services has released rulemaking
which requires providers utilizing EHRs to comply with patients’ requests for logs of the accesses to their
records.
In this work, we outline our system for complying with this regulation while easing the burden of compli-
ance for providers and simultaneously providing patients with informative and satisfying information about
why their accounts were accessed. We implement a system called the Multiview Audit Interface (MAI) which
utilizes recent research in the data mining and anomaly detection communities to provide a unified interface
for conveniently using these algorithms for patients and administrators. We then test this system on a de-
identified access log from Northwestern Memorial Hospital containing months of audit data. We construct
a framework for implementing these algorithms as modules, thereby recycling existing code, encouraging
multi-faceted comprehensions of their results, and offering an easy-to-use interface that administrators and
patients can use alike. We demonstrate the the power of three modules currently implemented and show
how the extensibility of the framework can be harvested to develop modules in the future.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The primary focus of this paper will be on the security of electronic health records (EHRs) within the
United States and the context of its legislative and regulatory environment. EHRs are a collection of digital
information about an individual which can be accessed by various actors according to, or in violation of,
over-arching security protocol.
The advent of EHRs within the last few decades has led to an unprecedented growth in the utilization
of new technology in the domain of healthcare. EHRs have the potential to revolutionize the way that
healthcare is conducted by reducing costs, preventing human errors, increasing the speed of communication,
and advancing research.
In spite of this, the explosive growth of information technology in general has led to an influx of concerns
regarding safety and privacy from the general population. There have been numerous examples of personally
sensitive data being stolen, such as social security numbers, credit card data, and passwords to sites con-
taining private information. Likewise, the healthcare information technology industry is no more immune
to these concerns, and it is often an even greater target for parties interested in illegally acquiring personal
information. EHRs often combine medical diagnoses, prescription information, credit card data, addresses,
and much more.
To address these concerns, the United States congress has enacted a large body of legislation which
regulates what information is deemed sensitive, who can legally view or modify such information, and what
patients can do to protect and obtain their own information. Currently, patients in the United States have
the right to request an accounting of all disclosures of their protected health information (PHI) as well as a
record of all entities who access it. Such a right gives patients an abundance of information into the inner
workings of healthcare provider organizations, potentially to the point of confusing the patient and to the
dismay of organizational administrators.
In an effort to help healthcare organizations comply with regulatory requirements as well as to assist
patients in understanding their own access records, we have constructed a system for harvesting the fruits
of ongoing research in the machine learning and anomaly detection communities. This system, called MAI,
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provides both patients and administrators with tools for interacting with analytical algorithms to yield
constructive information about patients’ access records. The system currently supports two functionalities:
applying coloring rules to the access log elements which correspond to alert levels and providing descriptions
of those elements.
The academic community has put forth a wealth of research designed so address the problem of enforcing
patient privacy. Experience-based Access Management (EBAM) seeks to ensure that the continuously-
evolving ideal access policies do not deviate far from their real-world counterparts [16] by analyzing the way
that EHRs are actually accessed. The Explanation-based Auditing System (EBAS) evaluates the structure
of the audit logs to attempt to determine an explanation for the accesses therein [9]. Other techniques use
audit logs to analyze the access pattern of actors within an EHR system. These include the Community-
based Anomaly Detection System (CADS) [7], the Patient-Flow Anomaly Detection System (PFADS) [30],
and Specialized Network Anomaly Detection (SNAD) [8]. These techniques have been unified within the
Extensible Medical Open Audit Toolkit (EMOAT) [1] to model and analyze EHR access logs. MAI is a
natural extension to the EMOAT project to achieve the goal of increasing patient and healthcare personnel
understanding of acess logs.
The EHR vendor industry has also produced its share of solutions toward solving the problems outlined
in this text. Cerner Corporation has released an audit tool known as P2Sentinel, designed to gather audit
data and present the security personnel with reports and other interfaces for understanding the audit logs
[3]. FairWarning is a company that has produced audit log analytical software to work with multiple EHR
vendors. FairWarning’s software analyzes the audit logs for suspicious patterns and alerts the security
personnel when one is detected [2].
We will begin with a discussion of the present state of electronic health records in Chapter 2 followed
by a discription of the legislative and regulatory history around EHRs in Chapter 3. Next we describe the
design of our system in Chapter 4 before describing the modules currently implemented to work in the MAI
framework in Chapter 5. We discuss how standardized role mappings can be utilized to improve patient and
administrator understanding in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7 we cover the implementation details of the MAI
system. Lastly, we give a demonstration and use case in Chapter 8 followed by a discussion of the project
in Chapter 9.
2
Chapter 2
EHR Overview
An electronic health record (EHR) is a collection of digital data about a patient which is encapsulated in
such a way as to be more-or-less equivalent to a traditional paper health record but one which is more
conducive to electronic applications. EHRs can contain any data which is capable of taking a digital form
and run the gamut from simple text-based nurse’s notes to prescriptions, x-ray images, blood test results
and more. EHRs are widely considered to be crucial to the modernization of the healthcare industry as
they offer tremendous benefits over their paper-and-ink counterparts. In spite of their considerable benefits,
EHRs have been met with numerous concerns regarding their cost of implementation and perceived risks to
privacy.
2.1 Benefits and Risks
EHRs facilitate the ease of record-keeping, removing the need for large storage areas holding paper records,
and eliminate the need for manually transferring records between rooms in an institution, institutions in
a city or state, as well as between countries. Compatibility issues aside, EHRs have the potential to be
accessible from any hospital, clinic, or pharmacy in any part of the world. EHRs are also conducive to
data analysis which can help prevent missed life-saving diagnoses, erroneous prescriptions as well as deadly
medication reactions. EHRs have also been utilized to provide a wealth of research material, in de-identified
form, which is invaluable to researchers across the world.
2.1.1 Quality, Speed, and Convenience
Possibly the single most important aspect of the information technology revolution is the ability to program
a computer to do mundane tasks that would require a human hours, days, or longer to complete. Likewise,
EHRs have the potential to reduce the amount of paper-pushing and routine procedures often associated
with the medical industry. Rather than spending time looking for a paper health record which could be
misplaced, missing, or stolen and is incapable of duplication, an EHR can be instantly accessible from any
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location in the world with 100% reliability.
EHRs also eliminate the need for redundantly completing information. Once data is entered into an
EHR, it remains there until explicitly removed or updated. E-prescriptions can be transferred from clinic to
pharmacy in milliseconds, thereby eliminating the need for handling forgery- and error-prone prescription
pads. Data analysis can be performed on a patient’s health data to render a diagnosis which could take a
human being hours of poring over medical references to discover, regardless of his or her experience. EHRs
also provide built-in safeguards to alert medical staff of dangerous events such as drug interactions [18].
2.1.2 Coordination of Information
It is not unusual for a patient to be seen by a multitude of personnel, even for the most routine checkups.
Patient health data must be shared and coordinated efficiently between administrative staff, nurses, doctors,
radiologists and specialists to only name a few. Each of these individuals contribute to the care of a patient
in a limited way which must all sum to an effective treatment. To make healthcare more efficient, this
fragmented interaction with a patient’s care needs to be mitigated.
EHRs help ensure that each separate provider has as complete a picture of their patients as possible.
They eliminate the need for redundancy and the risk of data loss when transitioning between different
environments within an organization or between organizations. This greater availability of patient health
information also means that data is available when it is critically needed, such as when a patient is in an
emergency room and cannot provide his or her information [19].
In order to prevent the abuse of this abundance of information, much research has been conducted to
determine the best ways to protect patient data from unauthorized persons while simultaneously making it
available to those who have a legitimate need for it.
2.1.3 Diagnostic Assistance and Error Prevention
Maintaining a centralized point of reference for all of a patient’s medical information yields a great potential
for exploiting this wealth of data to assist medical professionals in making decisions. Computers are becoming
increasingly powerful and can find patterns in data that a human being would struggle to identify even if he
or she is searching for it. EHRs can aggregate a list of patient allergies which can be cross-referenced with
any drugs about to be administered to a patient, thereby averting a deadly reaction if the doctor is otherwise
unaware of the allergy. An EHR is aware of which medications a patient has been prescribed even if the
patient is uncomfortable making their doctor aware of his or her medical history due to its sensitive nature.
Computational power can also be leveraged to identify the best way to code a diagnosis or procedure since
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Statement Percentage Agreeing
Sending Rx electronically saves time 82
Saves on managing & storing paper costs 75
Overall, their practice functions more efficiently 79
An asset when recruiting physicians 68
Receive lab results faster 75
Produces financial benefits for the practice 67
Enhances data confidentiality 70
Table 2.1: Survey results from EHR adopters [21]
it is virtually impossible for a doctor to be aware of all available codes [20].
2.1.4 Patient Involvement
Since the development of the Internet, the world has become a much more connected and collaborative place.
Now the technology is available for a patient to easily interact with his or her care providers at any time
and from any place. EHRs encourage this kind of distributed collaboration by making health data readily
accessible for both the patient and the provider. A patient can now update his healthcare provider with new
information whenever it is most convenient for the patient and this results in more timely treatment of new
maladies.
The development of the Personal Health Record (PHR) has surfaced in recent years. These records
are chiefly maintained by the patient itself, and allow the patient greater accountability for his or her own
health. Patients are now able to fill in data in a guided fashion which can encourage preventative treatment
and early detection of oncoming disease.
2.1.5 Cost and Efficiency
According to a recent national survey of meaningful-use ready doctors, EHRs have a palpable impact on the
efficiency of healthcare organizations. In each of the statements shown in Table 2.1, more than two-thirds of
respondents agreed that efficiency had increased since the adoption of an EHR. These results suggest that
there is a considerable gain in efficiency within hospitals across the country due to implementing EHRs.
2.1.6 Roadblocks to Adoption
EHR systems, by their nature, are more conducive to being adopted by large organizations rather than
smaller ones. Most of the reasons for this are outlined below: EHRs require a massive commitment from an
organization in terms of money, time, talent, and legal resources. In order for widespread EHR adoption to
become a reality, the following issues must be addressed. [15]
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Financial Burdens
The financial burden of EHR implementations is probably the single largest barrier to their widespread
adoption. Not only are EHRs associated with a high cost of implementation, but there is a good deal of
uncertainty about their true return for the investment. Implementing an EHR consists of a number of
complex phases including conversion of paper information to electronic data, implementing a system that
works reliably within each organization, configuration to work with existing systems, training the staff to
use it, and maintaining the EHR as the organization evolves over time.
Technological Maturity Concerns
New technologies are innately unstable, and EHRs are no exception. It is not uncommon for the more
conservative consumer to wait some time before he or she begins using a new technology, allowing the early
adopters to handle all of the bugs and difficulties in early versions of a system. It is no wonder, then,
that some healthcare providers would prefer to not adopt a new technology especially when that technology
requires a vast commitment.
Some trained healthcare professionals do not use computers much at home and therefore have little
training that would encourage EHR adoption. Furthermore, EHR systems require large amounts of data for
even mid-level providers and can be exceedingly complex. This can lead to a scenario in which applications
running on top of the EHR system are sluggish to respond, are unreliable in behavior, or may even experience
data corruption. The Certification Commission for Health Information Technology (CCHIT) has sought to
remedy these concerns by giving criteria for evaluating EHR systems.
Complying with Regulations
EHRs, and healthcare in general, are associated with a large and complex body of legislation, much of
which is covered in Chapter 3. While existing legislations take great strides to encourage the adoption of
EHR adoption, there is still a cost-benefit analysis that a provider must consider before implementing an
EHR system. There is currently no legal requirement for adopting electronic health records, but legislation
encourages it by providing financial incentives.
A provider must consider several things when determining if an EHR system is worth implementing.
• How well will one be able to comply with new regulations? Much of the United States healthcare
system reform has introduced new liabilities for providers implementing EHRs, such as offering the
ability for a patient to acquire an access report.
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• Who will be affected by new legal requirements after adoption? New avenues of achieving results also
enlarge the amount of a provider which can be held accountable. E-prescribing, for instance, makes
ordering prescriptions much easier but also potentially increases the number of physicians making
legally questionable prescriptions.
• How will regulations about disclosures of PHI affect one’s practice? The new ease of information
dispersal accompanying EHRs increases the ability for data to be disclosed. A provider may be
concerned that this encourages PHI being given to inappropriate parties.
2.1.7 Security Concerns
Given all of the potential costs and benefits of adopting an EHR system, it is paramount that the effort of
making EHRs a reality not go to waste by allowing unrestrained access to patients’ sensitive information.
A centralized data store for all patients within a country has typically been poorly received in the United
States. When the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA, see Section 3.1) of 1996
was passed, a national patient identifier (NPI) was required by law, but two years later federal funds were
prohibited from being spent on developing the NPI following public outcry [6].
As a result, all of the patient information within the United States is distributed across multitudes of
non-uniform systems which are provided by several vendors. In addition, it is not uncommon for patient
health data to be disclosed to the business associates of healthcare organizations, thereby leading to an even
larger distribution of health data. It is then understandable that so much effort would be put into place to
protect patient health data such as the regulations that we will discuss in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3
Regulations
An abundance of legislation and regulation has been introduced into the United States legal system in order to
address the concerns outlined in Chapter 2. In this chapter we will present the two core pieces of healthcare IT
legislation, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and the Health Information Technology
for Economic and Clinical Health Act, and how they present the need for the research in this text.
3.1 HIPAA
Healthcare information technology has a long history of oversight in the United States, but much of its
modern roots can be traced back to the passage of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996 (HIPAA). Prior to the enacting of this law, health insurance entities, now called “covered entities” had
disparate means for conducting administrative business such as submitting claims. Furthermore, there were
no uniform methods or standardizations for exchanging electronic data between healthcare entities nor were
there modern guarantees about the security and privacy of electronic data.[5] To address these concerns, the
United States congress passed HIPAA and, in doing so, included many provisions for protecting the privacy
and security of protected health information.
3.1.1 Privacy
Compliance for the HIPAA Privacy Rule was required as of April 2003 [24]. The Privacy Rule regulations
are intended to prevent the abuse of PHI and ensure that its use is always appropriate for medical care.
Prior to HIPAA, most privacy laws applied to personal information such as financial information but failed
to extend to medical data. In addition to insufficient existing laws, the healthcare privacy law was plagued
with dozens of inconsistent state laws, mostly applying to sensitive diagnoses.[29].
The Privacy Rule uniformly addresses all of these problems by defining how protected health information
may be legally disclosed by covered entities and their business associates. Essentially, any covered entity
may disclose PHI without the patient expressing his or her authorization if the disclosure is for the purposes
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of treatment, payment, or health care operations.
The nature of the PHI itself is defined by its individual identifiability; that is, if it is identified with an
individual. This type of data includes all possible forms such as writtent, oral and electronic. De-identified
health information has no restricted disclosure and is often used for research purposes.
3.1.2 Security
The Security Rule is a counterpart to the Privacy Rule which applies specifically to electronic health data.
It defines a set of security standards required to be implemented to protect PHI. These standards were
designed to follow best practices and increase patients’ confidence that their PHI would not be improperly
stored, discarded or otherwise leaked. Simultaneously, the Security Rule was written in such a way so as
not to stifle innovation or prevent the full utilization of the benefits of EHRs
The first methods described in the Security Rule for ensuring the security of PHI are those of administra-
tive safeguards. The management of a covered entity is required by law to “reduce risks and vulnerabilities
to a reasonable and appropriate level.” Information access should be governed by a role-based access control
policy and each person should have minimal privileges possible according to his or her role.
Additionally, covered entities are required to fulfill physical security requirements. Not only must facilities
be locked and managed appropriately, but safety measures must be taken moving or disposing of physical
media. For instance, HIPAA requires that the hard disks from terminals containing PHI be wiped so that
the data is irrecoverable.
Finally, technical safeguards must also be put into place to comply with the Security Rule. As previously
mentioned, access controls must be put into place to prevent granting overly-generous privileges to employ-
ees of a covered entity. All PHI must be protected with integrity-checking mechanisms that prevent the
alteration or destruction of data by unauthorized persons. When transferring data between entities, data
must be protected by encryption to prevent eavesdropping or alteration. Covered entities are also required to
implement audit controls. These mechanisms record the accesses made to PHI which can later be reviewed
by security personnel or automated anomaly detection software.
3.2 HITECH
The wide-spread adoption of EHRs came about following the enaction of the Health Information Technology
for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) of 2009 which was included as a title under the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act, providing economic stimulus spending. This act greatly incentivized the
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“meaningful use” of EHRs, meaning that providers must implement and use EHRs in a way that improves
the quality of care in order to take advantage of the incentives. [10] Beginning in 2015, providers who do
not implement a certified EHR will be penalized a percentage of Medicare payments.
3.2.1 Achieving Meaningful Use
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) have divided the process of achieving meaningful
use of EHRs into two broad steps, termed Stage 1 and Stage 2 [11]. Stage 1 consists of 15 mandatory
requirements, called Core Requirements as well as 10 other Menu Requirements of which half must be met.
The Core Requirements largely consist of automated statistical data accumulation and reporting as well
as direct electronic equivalents to existing paper record functions. The later category requires functionality
such as maintaining electronic medications and allergy lists, issuing electronic perscriptions and providing
the patient with an electronic copy of their PHI upon request. There are also a few more advanced functions
which are currently technically tractible, including drug-drug and drug-allergy reaction checks and clinical
decision support.
Stage 2 meaningful use has a similar structure, with 17 Core Objectives and 6 Menu Objectives, of
which 3 must be met [14]. Most of the Core Objectives of Stage 2 are duplicates of those in Stage 1 but
are accompanied by more stringent measurements, meaning that the use of EHRs and their associated
applications must be more widespread [13]. Most of the Menu Objectives require the gathering of statistical
information such as family health history or cancer cases and sometimes require submitting them to a
specialized registry.
By incentivizing the widespread adoption of the meaningful use of electronic health records, the United
States government is prioritizing the gathering of personal health data in large amounts and using those data
in novel and varied ways. Rather than inhibiting the march of progress, the United States congress dedicated
a portion of HITECH to the preservation of patient privacy and bolstering the provisions of HIPAA.
3.2.2 Subtitle D
HITECH Subtitle D was constructed to modify existing laws regarding the privacy and security of protected
health information, largely through means of mandatory information disclosures by covered entities, per-
forming audits and strengthening penalties for violators. Under Subtitle D, upon the discovery of a breach of
PHI, a covered entity or the business associate of covered entity is required to notify not only the individuals
affected but also the prominent media outlets[17]. Furthermore, the HHS Interim Final Rule for Subtitle D
modifies the Social Security Act by establishing a tiered set of penalties based on the nature of the violations
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and by eliminating some exemptions for covered entities which are unaware of violations as well as those
who correct a violation within a timely manner [23].
3.3 OCR NPRM for Accounting of Disclosures
As part of the evolving regulatory landscape of the HITECH Act, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) within
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)
in May 2011 [22] which announced proposed rules for enforcing the legal document. Among numerous
other changes, HHS stated their intention to extend the existing provision allowing patients to acquire an
accounting of the disclosures of their health information. Prior to the rulemaking, exemptions had been
included for accounting of PHI disclosures made for the purposes of treatment, payment and health care
operations. The NPRM proposed, in contrast, to eliminate this exemption for covered entities utilizing
electronic health records, believing that the overhead for implementing such functionality would be quite
limited. Furthermore, HHS announced that patients would also be able to receive an access report which,
in contrast to an accounting of disclosures, would include a summary of all individuals accessing their
information, regardless of whether the information was disclosed to an external entity.
This new regulation simultaneously promises to give a patient great freedom over his or her own informa-
tion in an electronic medical record by allowing the patient to know precisely who accesses his information
and when. Unfortunately, this also presents a considerable burden on healthcare providers who must pro-
vide these reports as well as respond to any criticisms raised by the patients who receive them. Because
the knowledge of patients and administrators alike is quite limited in the context of such a vast system as
a modern healthcare provider, there needs to be a way to automate as much of the implementation of the
NPRM as possible.
3.4 Access Reports
The NPRM proposed the following data to be present in the access report for each access to a patient’s PHI:
1. The date of access.
2. The time of access.
3. The name of the person, if available, or entity accessing the information.
4. A description of the information accessed, if available.
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5. A brief description of the action taken, if available.
According to the NPRM, HHS “expect[s] that all access logs include this information, so [they] believe
it should be readily available for inclusion in access reports without substantial burden to covered entities
and business associates.” HHS further does not require the presence of a reason of access because in doing
so “the burden on covered entities and business associates in identifying the purpose of each access to
electronic designated record set information significantly outweighs the benefit to individuals of learning of
such information.” However, it seems likely that a patient, upon receiving a copy of his or her access report,
could become concerned with the nature of the accesses, particularly if their record is accessed by individuals
with unfamiliar role titles whom the patient has never encountered.
Table 3.1 contains a sample of an actual de-identified access log for a single patient exctracted from
Northwest Memorial Hospital in Chicago. In a real-world situation, the users would be identified by their
real name. In the Northwestern Memorial Hospital access log, each user is assigned a position, or role, and
the automatically-generated access reason is often similar to the role description. One can see that if a user
has a highly-specialized role, the natural access reason available will not be clear to the patient.
Date Time Name Reason
11/23/2010 6:33 User A OR RN SC- Primary
11/23/2010 6:56 User B Resident- Inpatient Primary Service
11/23/2010 7:17 User C Anesthesiologist
11/23/2010 7:22 User D OR RN SC- Primary
11/23/2010 7:31 User D CRNA
11/23/2010 7:32 User E OR RN SC- Primary
11/23/2010 8:44 User F Auditing/Quality
11/23/2010 8:48 User D CRNA
11/23/2010 8:52 User D CRNA
11/23/2010 10:42 User G OR RN SC- Primary
11/23/2010 10:46 User H Med Student - Outpatient/ED/Procedures
11/23/2010 10:48 User B Resident- Inpatient Primary Service
11/23/2010 14:32 User I Primary Staff Nurse
11/23/2010 16:57 User F Auditing/Quality
11/29/2010 13:44 User J Billing
11/29/2010 20:39 User J Billing
11/30/2010 12:21 User K Physician Office
Table 3.1: A sample of a de-identified access log
Table 3.2 contains a list of the nine most prevalent positions within the Northwestern Memorial Hostpital
access logs. The positions in this table are ordered by the percentage of encounters accessed by that position.
Typically an encounter is defined as the entire span of time that a patient is at a hospital, so each encounter
can be thought of as a collection of accesses to an EHR. It is unlikely that a patient checking his or her
access record will understand the purpose of any of these positions and it is possible that even a hospital
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administrator would not know the meaning of some of them.
Position % of Encounters
HIM 93.70%
UR/QA 1 52.36%
HIM - Specialist 16.87%
Reg/Sched Super-User 16.67%
NMPG MD - CPOE 5.24%
NMPG MA 4.25%
NMH Operations 3.79%
UR/QA 2 1.69%
Any of the above 95.69%
Table 3.2: A list of the nine most active positions within NMH
We believe that current technology is sufficiently advanced to address these concerns by assisting both
the patients and administrators in learning about the nature of accesses. Statistical analysis and machine
learning algorithms are capable of detecting patterns within vast amounts of data which can be leveraged to
either explain legitimate accesses or to detect anomalous accesses. Using these techniques, patients can be
given information about the accesses to their EHR in order to alleviate concerns over who is accessing their
information. Meanwhile, administrators can utilize an interface to understand accesses in the event that a
patient is still concerned with an access. He or she can then use that information to act accordingly.
Before we proceed in implementing a system for generating contextualized and descriptive access reports,
we must first analyze the requirements for implementing such a system. It must be capable of responding
to a varied set of users who are widely distributed geographically, responding in a satisfying manner, and
flexible enough to envelop future developments.
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Chapter 4
Design Requirements
In this chapter we outline the design requirements for the MAI system. This system must simultaneously
satisfy an array of players who will use it:
• Patients must be able to access the system from any location and request an access report in a timely
manner.
• Security Administrators must be able to use the system to gather evidence for or against an investiga-
tion into a HIPAA violation or simply the questions of a concerned patient.
• EHR Administrators must be able to easily configure MAI to work with their EHR implementation
regardless of the technologies they use.
• Researchers and Developers must have a well-defined yet flexible framework for implementing analyt-
ical components into the system. This framework must also be accomodating to new and evolving
technologies.
4.1 Cross-platform Compatibility
Because of the vast array of technologies employed in an EHR environment, it is important to be mindful
when designing MAI of the need for cross-platform compatibility. It is impossible to rely upon patients and
administrators to predominantly use a single operating system or have the necessary set of libraries to use
MAI. With the emergence of smartphones and tablets it is increasingly apparent that supporting one or
even two operating systems would prevent a large swath of the potential users from utilizing MAI.
For these reasons, we have decided to implement the front-end user interface as a web application.
Virtually no consumer-grade electronics with internet access lack a web browser, so the full user base can
take advantage of MAI with existing hardware.
In addition to having a widely-supported user interface, it is necessary to implement the business logic
of MAI in a way such that it could be readily ported to virtually any EHR vendor. Our basic assumption is
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that the audit logs of any EHR can be gathered in a tabular format such as a Structured Query Language
(SQL) database and retrieved through simple SQL select statements. This assumption is reflected in the
language of the Department of Health and Human Services’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding
HIPAA’s privacy policy.
The MAI framework was therefore decided to be implemented on top of an Apache Tomcat Java container.
The Java Enterprise Edition runtime has implementations for nearly all operating systems and architectures
used in server environments. Each anomaly detection module used by MAI must then implement a Java
interface to the tomcat server and respect the module lifecycle contract outlined in Chapter 7. Once the
module’s Java interface has been defined, the module is free to follow any code path it requires which includes
querying for access log data, processing the data, and writing intermediate results to disk. At this point it
is up to the module designer to uphold cross-platform compatibility or to disregard it entirely as he or she
sees fit.
4.2 Real-time Responsiveness
The performance of each individual module must have the appearance of real-time responsiveness to the
end user so that when he or she logs into MAI via the web interface, all analysis on the patient’s records is
instantaneously available. Unfortunately, many of the intended modules for use in MAI require a massive
amount of calculations which can require hours or even days on powerful servers, depending on the size
of the access log in question. Furthermore, many modules need some contextual information about the
day-to-day activities within the hospital, how social networks develop over time, and how roles typically
behave. Therefore most modules require more data than simply a single patient’s access log and often the
entire access log must be provided for stable results.
To address this issue, we have divided the module lifecycle into multiple phases outlined in Chapter 7
which includes a preprocessing stage. In this stage, a module is expected to perform computations on as
much of the available access log data as it requires and then store the results so that they can be acquired
later on by the end user. The module will then periodically be updated with incoming access log data and
asked to renew its preprocessing.
A major drawback to this blocked approach is clear: if a patient’s record has been accessed more recently
than the latest module update, then that segment of the audit log will have no associated anomaly informa-
tion. In a real world implementation, we would suggest alerting the administrator when he or she queries
for anomaly data on a patient who has unprocessed accesses so that they don’t mistakenly think that the
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Figure 4.1: Architecural Diagram of MAI
modules have tried and failed to detect an anomaly.
4.3 Separation of Concerns
Broadly, the MAI architecture can be seen as a model-view-controller architecture. The user, a patient or
administrator, logs into a webpage which displays access logs and information about the accesses, roles, and
users. This component is referred to as the front-end. The core business logic is handled by a Java Enterprise
Edition (Java EE) application running on a Apache Tomcat web server, collectively called the middleware.
The middleware supports a plug-and-play interface for the analytical modules which must simply implement
the necessary Java interface and be registered with the middleware. All of the data to be processed is
contained within a normalized SQL database running on the server, or potentially elsewhere, and is referred
to as the back-end. The high-level architectural diagram can be seen in Figure 4.1.
Because of the need for interchangeable analytical modules, we have designed and developed an applica-
tion programming interface for the modules, called the Module API which is outlined in 4.5.
4.4 Code Reuse
MAI was designed to impose as few constraints on the module developer as possible while still treating each
module as an abstract component. Each module must implement a Java class which is used to interface with
the MAI middleware, but the modules should not be constrained to being programmed entirely in Java.
Much of the machine learning and statistical analysis software used in these respective communities are
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written in other languages, using other environments. In order to reuse code from Matlab or R, the module
programmer is able to implement a Java wrapper class to interface with the middleware, and then it is free
to use local storage, the network, call external processes, or any other programming contruct it desires.
4.5 Module API Design
The purpose of the Module API is to allow distinct, interchangeable anomaly detection algorithms to operate
in a uniform way on access log data from an Electronic Health Record (EHR). The current focus for this
project is to allow a module to register with a web framework, extract all necessary data for preprocessing,
and, upon requests in real-time, provide a measure of the degree to which an element in the EHR is anoma-
lous. This must be done in a way that is independent of the algorithm’s implementation, so that previously
developed algorithms can be leveraged and so that the author of the algorithm is not constrained to any
implementation decisions.
4.5.1 Architecture
The architecture of MAI is a three-tiered architecture consisting at a high level of the user’s front-end
applications, seen through a web browser, a middleware server hosting a Tomcat Java Servlet container, and
a database containing the EHR access logs.
The middleware is responsible not only for responding to HTTP requests from the clients but also for
coordinating the Module Lifecycle (Section 4.5.2). The middleware must allow module registration and
removal, facilitate organization among modules, supply modules with the EHR access log data in an usable
format, and requesting anomaly measurements for EHR components from the modules.
4.5.2 The Module Lifecycle
Here we will outline the distinct phases in a module’s lifecycle in relation to its interaction within the web
framework. The phases are, in chronological ordering, module registration, preprocessing, real-time queries
(RTQ) and uninstallation. Module registration (Section 4.5.2) enables the MAI middleware to understand
the functionality of a module and know how to shift the flow of execution to it. Preprocessing (Section 4.5.2)
tells the module to begin gathering data, running analysis on it, and storing the results as needed. RTQ
(Section 4.5.2) begins once preprocessing is complete and enables the end user to issue data queries which
complete in real time. Lastly, uninstallation (Section 4.5.2) is called to let the module clean up any and all
intermediate storage that it has used.
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Module Registration
Each module must make the middleware aware of its existence and supply enough information for the
middleware to know what information to provide and how to understand the module’s output. This process
is called Module Registration (MR) and is implemented by defining a well-formatted Extensible Markup
Language (XML) [28] file containing the meta-data required by the middleware.
The requirements for this stage are:
1. Provide the name of the module.
2. Provide the class name and location of the Java interface for the module.
3. Give the preferred format for data needed for preprocessing, if any.
4. Define the parameters required for the algorithm to yield a result at runtime, i.e., does the module
require a patient ID, user ID, timestamp, etc.
5. Define the return type for real-time queries.
Optional parameters are:
1. Provide extra information for more efficient processing so that, for example, multiple queries can be
combined into a single query.
2. Provide a time frame for how often to update the module with new data.
3. Tell the server that it is or is not okay to cache results between data updates.
4. Provide a true or false value for whether the server should pre-fetch queries from the module before
the user has selected the module. This reduces the latency seen by the user but may not be desirable
if the module requires significant resources.
Once this information is defined in an XML document, the module can be registered and the middleware
will update or append the master XML file which contains the behavior for each module as well as the
protocol for interoperating the modules.
Preprocessing
Since many of the anomaly detection algorithms we will be using require a significant amount of training
time, it is necessary to include preprocessing time in the MAI protocol. Preprocessing can begin at any
time the middleware desires, so long as it has audit log data ready for consumption by the modules, by
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calling the preprocess() method exposed by the class referenced in the module’s registration XML file. The
middleware will supply data in the format requested in the same XML file. The module must also implement
a preprocessingComplete() method which will return true when the module has finished this stage.
Real-time Queries
Once the module returns true from the preprocessingComplete() method, the middleware will enable users
to select the module via the front-end web application. The middleware will supply the module with the
data defined in the registration XML file, as well as an API for making queries on the database. The
module will return data in the format defined. The middleware will then construct the webpage for the
client appropriately.
Uninstallation
If a module needs to be removed, it should provide a cleanup() method to destroy all of the persistent data
it has created.
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Chapter 5
Modules
In this chapter we outline the modules which have been thus far implemented in the MAI system. Each
module has its own set of required parameters as well as its own information that it yields. Every module
must be handled in a uniform manner by the MAI system, so we discuss how the architecture outlined in
Chapter 4 addresses this. The implementation details for each module can be found in Section 7.3
5.1 Notes and Orders
The Notes and Orders module looks at the current state of the access log and looks for accesses for which
there was a change to a note or an order. The core reasoning for this module is that if an EHR user, such as
a nurse, examines a patient’s record, they are unlikely to make a note or an order if the access is illegitimate
in nature. When a user makes such a modification, the notes and orders are typically reviewed by at least
one other member of the staff, therefore bringing attention to the access.
The Notes and Orders module requires no preprocessing or uninstallation time, but does need a database
connection during the RTQ phase. In a strict sense, Notes and Orders only requires an access id as input,
but for efficiency purposes it should be given the patient id as well so that batch processing can occur.
5.2 Position Explainer
In order to give both patients and administrators some textual information about why a user accesses a
patient’s record, we have developed the Position Explainer module. This module builds on the principles
which will be discussed in Chapter 6 by calculating the likelihood of a user accessing a patient’s record based
on the patient’s diagnosis information.
Each patient has zero or more ICD-9 diagnoses associated with them and patients with similar diagnoses
tend to follow similar workflows. For example, when a patient is admitted to a hospital with a broken leg he
or she will follow a routine procedure such as check in at reception, have a physical examination, go through
radiology for an x-ray, have a cast placed on the leg, and discharge. It is highly unlikely that a patient with
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a broken leg will need an abdominal ultrasound or a psychiatric screening, such as are common for expecting
mothers and mental health patients, respectively. This principle means that many diagnoses have a high
likelihood of being accessed by a particular user if that user has one of the common roles associated with
the diagnosis.
The Position Explainer module requests a patient id and user id as input and returns a description if
that user’s position has a sufficiently high likelihood of accessing the patient based on his or her diagnoses.
For each diagnosis belonging to the patient, the module determines the likelihood a role accessing a patient
with that diagnosis and repeats this for each role belonging to a user in the patient’s access log. If the
likelihood is higher than a tunable threshold, the user is given a message stating that the user’s position is
highly associated with his or her diagnosis.
5.3 CADS
The community-based anomaly detection system (CADS) was developed to detect anomalous actors within
a collaborative information system [7]. CADS works by building a social network that connects users who
access the same patient record within an EHR. Once the social network has been constructed, CADS performs
principal component analysis on the network to extract the principal communities within the network. After
this decomposition, each user can be compared to his or her nearest neighbors via the k-nearest neighbors
algorithm which then gives a deviation for each user from his or her community.
CADS requires considerable preprocessing time compared with the other two modules as it performs
a number of complex calculations on a large data set. CADS asks for a patient id during its session
initialization phase so that it can quickly return its results without needing to repeatedly look up results for
each user when only a small number of users are anomalous. It returns both a double as an anomaly score
as well as a description yielding information about why the user was detected as anomalous.
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Chapter 6
Explanations/Standardized Mapping
Since the position names within the NMH data set can be unclear, ambiguous, and difficult to understand,
we hope to be able to soon be able to map these positions to a widely standardized set of values that have a
clearer meaning. One way of achieving this is to use the Healthcare Provider Taxonomy Code (HPTC) Set
[12], which is a hierarchical set of standardized position codes used in the United States.
6.1 Role and Access Coverage
We have acquired a mapping between the position names in the NMH database and the codes in the HPTC
set, courtesy of Dan Cushman, which we hope to leverage for this purpose. An example of the mapping is
shown in Table 6.1.
Unfortunely, this mapping is not complete. Of the 159 positions that we have in our data set, only 66
(41.5%) are mapped to HPTCs. We will refer to those positions with a HPTC code as “covered” positions
or “covered” roles. Luckily, most of the more common positions do have mappings, as 4,984,334 out of the
6,075,530 (82.0%) accesses in database are made by a user with a position that is mapped to an HPTC. In
fact, 44% of the accesses made by uncovered roles are due to a single role, “Patient Care Assistive Staff”.
Nearly all (90%) of these uncovered accesses are attributed to 14 of the 93 (15.0%) uncovered roles, which
are shown in Table 6.2. The distribution of the uncovered roles can be seen in Figure 6.1. Since the graph
demonstrates a rather sharp decline in the coverage, we may be able to utilize the mapping that we have to
discover a clearer structure from the positions in our data set.
NMH Position HPTC HPTC Description
Chaplain 374K00000X Chaplain
Dietary 1 133V00000X Dietitian, Registered
ED Patient Care Staff Nurse 163WE0003X Emergency
NMPG APRN 364S00000X Clinical Nurse Specialist
Table 6.1: An example of NMH positions mapped to HPTCs
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Position % of Uncovered Accesses
Patient Care Assistive Staff 44.3
Unit Secretary 1 11.6
UR/QA 1 11.2
NMH Physician Office - CPOE 5.7
HIM 5.4
Health Information Audit-Consultant 2.3
NMPG OB PEDS MD - CPOE 1.8
NMH Resident/Fellow ID Clinic-CPOE 1.5
ED Assistant 1.1
ED Unit Secretary 1.1
ED NMH Physician-CPOE 1.1
Unit Secretary 2 1.0
Reg/Sched Super-User 1.0
ED Coder 0.9
Table 6.2: Uncovered Roles: The roles that together account for 90% of the uncovered accesses.
Figure 6.1: Uncovered Accesses: The percentage of accesses left uncovered by each role, sorted by
decreasing coverage and summed. The first 14 roles account for 90% of the uncovered accesses while the
first 44 account for over 99% of the uncovered accesses.
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ICD9 Code # Prob = 1 Description
238.73 19 High grade myelodysplastic syndrome . . .
250.71 17 Type I (juvenile type) diabetes . . .
250.81 17 Type I (juvenile type) diabetes . . .
191.1 16 Malignant neoplasm of frontal lobe . . .
891.2 16 Open wound of knee, leg (except thigh). . .
208.9 15 Unspecified leukemia
237.6 15 Neoplasm of uncertain behavior of . . .
713.0 15 Arthropathy associated with other . . .
781.5 15 Clubbing of fingers
228.02 14 Hemangioma of intracranial structures
287.9 14 Unspecified hemorrhagic conditions
441.3 14 Abdominal aneurysm, ruptured
753 14 Congenital anomalies of urinary system
V10.42 14 Personal history of malignant neoplasm . . .
Table 6.3: ICD-9 code coverage of mapped positions: The number of positions for which the likelihood
accessing the given diagnosis is 100%, sorted by the number of positions with that probability.
6.2 Potential Uses
One immediate application of these results is to discover the how well accesses to patients having a particular
diagnosis can be explained by the user’s position. If we can map multiple NMH positions to their equivalent
HPTC, then we can discover how likely a HPTC position is to access a diagnosis. This analysis can also be
repeated by wrapping multiple HPTC codes into a higher level in the HPTC hierarchy.
To get an idea of how well these results can be utilized, we ask the question: What is the liklihood of
a diagnosis being associated with a position code? This can be answered simply statistically analyzing our
data set. For each diagnosis and HPTC, we calculate how many patients with the diagnosis are accessed by
a position with the HPTC out of how many patients have the diagnosis.
It turns out that for many ICD-9 codes, the likelihood described above is very high for a large number
of positions. Table 6.3 gives a list of the top 14 most well-covered ICD-9 codes by this calculation. The
first column is the list of ICD-9 codes sorted by the value in the second column, which are the number of
positions for which the probability calculated above is 100%. The last column gives the description of the
ICD-9 code.
With the further development of the HPTC mapping, or other similar ways to derive standardized
positions from the NMH positions, we should be able to better understand the structure of the data set
in terms of how users access patients with certain diagnoses. This information can then be leveraged in
the development of a new module which analyzes the likelihood of a user accessing a patient based on his
diagnosis.
This type of module is currently implemented as the Position Explainer module, mentioned in Section
24
5.2, but does not utilize the standard mapping because it is not sufficiently developed at this time.
Another potential use for this mapping would be to utilize external references to the HPTC mapping.
For instance, the user could be provided additional information about the position who has accessed their
record, such as a website detailing the purpose of each role. This would be a significant benefit for the
patient so that he or she would not be left wondering what the esoteric positions are that reference his or
her account.
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Chapter 7
Implementation
We will now discuss the current implementation details of the MAI system including the various technologies
that are used and the ways in which the design goals set forth in Chapter 4 are achieved.
7.1 Model View Controller Architecture
The Model View Controller (MVC) architecure is implemented, broadly, as a user interface (the front-end), a
server managing business logic (the middleware) and a database (the back-end). Patients and administrators
who wish to use MAI do so by logging in to the front-end via a webpage, served by an Apache Tomcat web
server running Java code. This web server contains all of the middleware which manages querying the
database, organizing it, calling the analytical modules, and responding to the users’ HTTP requests. The
database contains a normalized data set retrieved from Northwestern Memorial Hospital of the inpatient
access log over the course of 128 days.
Figure 7.5 contains a diagram of how the components are divided between front-end, middleware, and
back-end and the technologies used to communicate between them.
7.1.1 User Interface
The MAI user interface is implemented as a set of JavaServer Pages (JSPs) which are compiled by the
middleware before being sent to the user for viewing. The user’s browser also makes asynchronous calls via
JavaScript to the middleware where Java servlets reply to the requests.
The current implementation of the MAI front-end divides the user interface into two perspectives: Patient
View and Administrator View. The Patient View is primarily a restricted version of the Administrator View,
hiding information which is sensitive in nature, such as users or accesses which are detected as “anomalous”
by the modules.
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<coloringlist>
<coloring>
<userId>34357</userId>
<doublerank>1.0</doublerank>
</coloring>
</coloringlist>
Figure 7.1: Example of the coloring XML returned from the Coloring servlet
Administrator View
The Administrator View consists initially of a page in which the user inputs a patient ID into a text field for
querying. In a real-world implementation, this would probably have multiple options for querying a user’s
identity as it is rare for healthcare workers to have a unique identifier for a patient. Since our dataset is
de-identified, the field only asks for the patient id field from the patient table in the database. This ID
is a primary key for the patient table and is therefore unique.
When the patient id is submitted to the form, the server responds with a new page consisting of a
complete list of audit logs for that patient. This is divided into possibly several HTML tables, one for each
of the patient’s encounters. The user is then presented with buttons for each of the active modules currently
available. If a module has encountered an error, or its preprocessing stage is incomplete, the button will not
be shown.
When the user clicks a module button, an asynchronous call is made via JavaScript to the middleware
by an HTTP GET request issued to the appropriate servlet. Currently the middleware implements two
Java servlets, Coloring.java and Descriptions.java which handle, respectively, the tasks of coloring the
access log and providing descriptions of the access log.
The HTTP GET request issued by the client-side JavaScript is sent a URL specifying the servlet to
call (either Coloring or Descriptions). with the module id and patient id as query parameters. The
module id is a universally unique identifier (UUID) generated when the module is registered, and the
patient id is the patient’s primary key in the patient table.
The servlet then calls the appropriate module and returns XML to the client containing the coloring or
descriptions information, such as seen in Figures 7.1 and 7.2. The user’s JavaScript then parses the XML
and either adds coloring to the access log or generates a icons notifying the user that there is a description
available. The user can then hover over the icon to read the description.
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<descriptionlist>
<description>
<accessId>312546</accessId>
<value>The user for access 312546 wrote to a note or order.</value>
</description>
</descriptionlist>
Figure 7.2: Example of the description XML returned from the Descriptions servlet
Patient View
The Patient View for the front-end is, currently, just a restriction of the Administrator View. It is necessary
to limit the amount of information presented to the patient, especially when there are potential HIPAA
violations being considered.
The Patient View is implemented using the same technology as the Administrator view, but the set of
modules exposed to the user are restricted. Currently, only the Position Explainer module is available to the
patient because it only provides information explaining the roles which are present in the access log. The
other two modules provide more detailed anomaly detection information and are therefore not given to the
patient.
7.1.2 Database
The access log data in the data set was supplied by the Northwestern Memorial Hospital (NMH) in Chicago,
Illinois and was gathered between late 2010 and early 2011. The dates in the access log are shifted from their
actual dates of occurrence in order to comply with HIPAA de-identification rules, but the dates are accurate
relative to each other. The dates in the access log span from September 4st, 2010 to January 10th, 2011. It
countains over 6 million accesses divided into more than 30,000 encounters. The NMH data set was supplied
as a series of flat comma-separated value (CSV) files extracted from NMH’s inpatient Cerner system.
In order to make sense of such a large data set and be able to process it quickly, we wrote a set of Python
scripts to read the raw CSV data and insert them into a normalized MySQL database and validate the data
once it was stored.
The structure of the database itself can be examined in detail in Appendix A by viewing the entity
relationship diagram and table summaries there. A number of tables not relevant to this work were excluded,
namely those relating to outpatient access data.
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Structure
In an effort to normalize the database, thereby minimizing its disk footprint, de-duplicating data, and
improving query efficiency, many tables were constructed to hold static data which was frequently repeated.
A summary of those tables follows.
• department: Each user is associated with one or more departments, such as “Allergy & Immunology”
and “Neurology”. There are 99 distinct departments represented in the data set.
• icd9 data: The data set consists of 11192 distinct International Classification of Diseases (ICD) version
9 (ICD-9) codes [27], divided between 1683 procedure codes and 9509 diagnosis codes. These codes
are an internationally standardized set of codes for the purposes of uniformly identifying diseases and
procedures. The icd9 data table consists of a textual code and a type field denoting whether it is for
diagnosis or procedure. The desc field contains a short description of the code, such as “Aneurysm
and dissection of heart.”
• location: This table contains the set of locations referred to in the NMH access logs. There are 57
distinct locations such as “Prentice 16” which typically have a ward- or floor-level granularity. No
locations are specific enough to identify an individual room.
• patient service: The patient service table contains a set of “services” to which a patient can be-
long. These bear a passing resemblance to the department table, but are not identical. Furthermore,
patient service elements are associated with a patient rather than with a user. Some examples
include “Obstetrics” and “General Medicine.”
• reason: The reason values are short strings that are highly correlated to the user’s role. None of the
reason values contain any contextual information about why an access is made. Examples include “ED
Patient Care Staff Nurse” and “HIM.”
• role: This table contains the roles, or positions, of a user. Most of them are highly abbreviated and
specialized names, such as “NMPG OB PEDS MD - CPOE”.
The database also consists of a number of structural tables, used to form associations between multiple
tables.
• user dept list: Since each user is associated with multiple departments, this table is needed to enable
such a one-to-many mapping. Each row in user dept list contains a reference to both the user table
and the department tables.
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• problem: Each patient must be associated with multiple ICD-9 diagnosis and procedure codes, so the
problem table exists to achieve this.
• icd9 grouping: The ICD-9 codes form a hierarchy, wherein each ICD-9 code in the icd9 data table
is at the bottom. The higher levels of the hierarchy are represented in the icd9 grouping table by
referencing the first and last (inclusively) ICD-9 codes in that grouping. The table refers to itself
through the parent id field and provides a text description of each grouping in the desc field.
The user and patient tables are structured as follows.
• user: This table encapsulates all data about an EHR user, one of the people working in Northwestern
Memorial Hospital who is recorded in the access logs. Each user has a user pseudonym that was
assigned at the time the access log data was extracted, thereby uniquely identifying each user in a
de-identified way. Each user has a role id which maps to a position in the role table.
• patient: Like user, each patient has a pseudonym assigned in the same way. Each patient also has
an age value and a zip code, de-identified to the initial three digits.
Lastly, the access and encounter tables contain the core information that we are interested in in this
work.
• encounter: An encounter starts whenever a user is admitted to a clinic and ends when the the user is
discharged and the billing cycle is complete. As such, each encounter has a start date (enc start dttm)
and an end date (enc end dttm). It has a reference to the patient id in the patient table for the
patient of this encounter. It also has a enc id which separates each encounter for a patient in the
original data set.
• access: An access associates many entities together and is generated whenever a user accesses a pa-
tient’s record within the EHR system. Each encounter is associated with a encounter,
patient service, user, and reason. There is also a date and time associated with the access in
the field user access dttm. Each access also has a user note cnt and user order cnt which de-
scribe, respectively, the number of notes and orders created on this access.
7.1.3 Business Logic
The core of MAI is implemented as a series of Java classes and libraries running inside an Apache Tomcat
Java container. All of the code for receiving and responding to HTTP requests, issuing queries, and launching
modules is implemented in this component.
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Measure Value
Accesses 6075530
Encounters 30913
Patients 25343
Users 8341
Roles 159
Reasons 287
Departments 99
Locations 57
Patient’s Services 34
Table 7.1: Statistics of the NMH access log data set
Key Classes
There are several Java classes that are critical to understanding how the MAI middleware functions.
Module: The Module class encapsulates the metadata about each of the modules registered on the server.
This class defines enumerates for the acceptable fields in the module registration XML files: ProcessingType,
ParameterType, and ReturnType. PreprocessingType can be either None or DBInstance, which determines
the behavior to take at preprocessing. ParameterType can be any of the values listed in the first column of
Table 7.2 following “parameter”. ReturnType currently only has the values of Double0To1 and Description.
The former states that the module returns a double value between 0.0 and 1.0, which can then be mapped
into a color. The latter provides a brief description of the results that the module found.
Module also has three nested static classes which encapsulate parts of the metadata within the reg-
istration XML. PreprocessingMeta describes the preprocessing information, InitializationMeta gives
information about what is required when the server initializes a new user session, and RuntimeQueryMeta
stores information about the inputs and outputs expected when processing a query. InitializationMeta
is currently used to bundle multiple queries into a single batch processing via the BatchProcess interface.
ModuleRegistry: As its name suggests, the ModuleRegistry is responsible for maintaining a collection
of modules which are registered with the server. It is a singleton class so that there is only a single instance
of the ModuleRegistry present on the server’s virtual machine at any time. The ModuleRegistry generates
a universally unique identifier (UUID) for each module registered with the middleware, so that the front-end
can have an unambiguous means to reference a module.
DBConnectionManager: This class is a thin wrapper around a JDBC instance which facilitates querying
the database for the module developer. It is instantiated by the MAI middleware with read-only capa-
bilities to prevent any unwanted changes to the database. This object is passed to every module via the
setConnectionManager() method required by the ModuleInterface class. This interface is described in
more detail in Section 7.2.2.
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Bootstrap Process
When the Tomcat server is started, a bootstrap thread is launched in order to initialize the server. At this
point, the server instantiates the ModuleRegistry and loads the module definitions from their XML sources
as outlined in Section 7.3.
Once all of the Module objects have been generated from the XML, their structure is validated. The
server verifies that the class referenced in the registration XML can be located and implements all of the
required interfaces based on their declared capabilities. This is done according to the specification shown in
Table 7.2.
After the structure of the ModuleRegistry has been validated, the bootstrap thread initializes the
DBConnectionManager for each module and passes it through the ModuleInterface.
setConnectionManager() method. The middleware then calls the ModuleInterface.preprocess() method
to begin module preprocessing. The server quickly checks to see if the preprocessing is complete by call-
ing ModuleInterface.pre- processingComplete() so that modules without preprocessing can be set to a
complete state immediately.
HTTP Responses
After the bootstrap thread finishes, the middleware is ready to begin serving clients who log on via the MAI
webpage. A thin shell of the webpage is implemented through JavaServer Pages. These pages are compiled
into Java bytecode when a client issues an HTTP request, and the execution of that bytecode results in a
standard HTML webpage.
Based on the user’s actions one of three pages is displayed: the welcome page, the administrator query
page, and the patient query page. The welcome page is a screen asking for the user to either select the
administrator or patient views, or to issue a query for a patient id. When a query is submitted from the
welcome page, it defaults to the administrator view.
When the user inputs a patient id query, a helper class called IndexHelper is instantiated with the
HTTP request data. This helper class then handles all of the logic behind what content is generated and
forwarded back to the user as HTML. The IndexHelper issues the query in Figure 7.3 against the back-end
looking for all accesses to this patient. This query finds all encounters belonging to the current patient
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s e l e c t a . a c c e s s i d , a . u se r acce s s dt tm , a . u s e r id , r . r o l e d e s c , a . e n c u n i q i d
from a c c e s s a inner j o i n user u on a . u s e r i d = u . u s e r i d
inner j o i n r o l e r on r . r o l e i d = u . r o l e i d
inner j o i n encounter e on e . e n c u n i q i d = a . e n c u n i q i d
where e . p a t i e n t i d = <p a t i e n t i d>
order by e . enc un iq id , a . u s e r a c c e s s d t tm ;
Figure 7.3: SQL query to select all needed information about accesses for the given patient id
Figure 7.4: A subset of the diagram relevant to the query in 7.3
Figure 7.5: Architecure Component Detail. The large boxes are, from left to right, the front-end,
middleware, and back-end. The front-end communicates with the middleware through HTTP while Tomcat
listens for incoming connections. Once a request is received it is forwarded to the MAI Java code. MAI
communicates with the registered modules via a series of Java Interfaces and supplies a read-only database
connection to the modules.
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Capability Java interfaces Optional? Phase when called
Any ModuleInterface.java N Module initialization
parameter/AccessId NeedsAccessId.java N Query Initialization/Runtime Queries
parameter/UserId NeedsUserId.java N Query Initialization/Runtime Queries
parameter/RoleId NeedsRoleId.java N Query Initialization/Runtime Queries
parameter/PatientId NeedsPatientId.java N Query Initialization/Runtime Queries
parameter/Timestamp NeedsTimestamp.java N Query Initialization/Runtime Queries
returnType/Description ReturnsDescription.java N Runtime Queries
returnType/Double0To1 ReturnsType.java N Runtime Queries
returnType/Double0To1 BatchProcess.java Y Runtime Queries
Table 7.2: Capabilities and Interfaces: The capabilities of a module and the required Java interfaces to
implement them. The first column contains the capability, which are divided into their semantic meaning,
i.e. whether they are a parameter or return type. Items marked “parameter/X” mean that X is a required
parameter and items marked “returnType/X” mean that X is returned by the module. In both cases X
must be declared in the registration XML. The second column gives the Java interface to implement and
the third column states whether it is optional to implement the interface in order to have that capability.
The last column gives the lifetime phase(s) in which that interface is used.
7.2 Module API Implementation
7.2.1 The Module Lifecycle
The module lifecycle is heavily controlled by the information that is defined in each module’s registration
XML. Examples of these XML files can be found in Figures 7.8, 7.9 and 7.9. When a module is registered, the
ModuleRegistry organizes all of the parameters required in the following phases of the module’s lifecycle.
During Phase 2, preprocessing, the module is given a database instance and told to begin preprocessing.
When the module begins declaring that its preprocessing is complete, the module buttons become visible to
the front-end user and the module enters Phase 3, run-time queries (RTQ).
Each time a user queries for a patient on the front-end, the module is given the type of data it declares as
a parameter in the initializationMeta element. The purpose of initialization metadata is mostly to yield
more efficient queries and computations which assure a more responsive user interface. Then the middleware
gives the module the parameters it requests in the runtimeQueryMeta element.
Phase 4, uninstallation, is not currently implemented.
7.2.2 Module Java Interfaces
When a module capability is declared in the registration XML file, the accompanying Java interfaces must be
implemented within the interface for that module so that the middleware can call the appropriate methods.
A summary of which Java interfaces go with each capability can be located in Table 7.2. The interface
hierarchy is shown in Figure 7.6.
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Figure 7.6: Current Module API Java Interfaces Hierarchy
35
select a.access_id from encounter e
inner join access a on a.enc_uniq_id = e.enc_uniq_id
where e.patient_id = <patient_id>
and (user_order_cnt > 0 or user_note_cnt > 0)
Figure 7.7: Query to retrieve Notes and Orders data
7.3 Module Implementations
7.3.1 Notes and Orders
The Notes and Order module is implemented entirely in Java. The Notes and Orders module class directly
implements four Java interfaces: NeedsPatientId, NeedsAccessId, BatchProcess<Integer,Double>, and
ReturnsDescription. It implicitly implements ModuleInterface and ReturnsType<Double> since
ReturnsType<Double> is a superinterface of BatcProcess<Integer,Double> and ModuleInterface is a
superinterface of all the Module API Java interfaces. The module registration XML can be seen in Figure
7.8.
Since Notes and Orders does not require any preprocessing, the
ModuleInterface.preprocess() method is blank and ModuleInterface.preprocessingComplete() re-
turns true immediately.
The registration XML states that to initialize the ModuleInterface for each query session, the patient id
should be provided. This allows the Notes and Orders module to retrieve all of the access data for the given
patient within a single query, rather than depending upon the middleware to send each access id one at a
time. When initialization occurs, the Notes and Orders module then issues the query in Figure 7.7 to retrive
the patient data.
When performing batch processing, the BatchProcess<Integer,Double>. getResultMap() function
returns a map associating access ids with a double value score. If an access appears in the query in Figure
7.7 then the score is set to a constant value representing a non-suspicious score. When an access does not
result from the above query, its score is omitted and assumed to be neutral.
7.3.2 Position Explainer
Like Notes and Order, the Position Explainer module is implemented entirely in Java and does not require
any preprocessing, though its performance would be improved if it were implemented. Position Explainer
is not like the other two modules in that it does not return any anomaly detection results, but rather only
explains the accesses that occur in the log. It does this in the following way:
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<module>
<name>Notes and Orders</name>
<class>seclab.aod.module.NotesAndOrdersModule</class>
<location>/NotesAndOrdersModule.class</location>
<preprocessingMeta>
<dataFormat>None</dataFormat>
</preprocessingMeta>
<initializationMeta>
<parameters>
<parameter>PatientID</parameter>
</parameters>
</initializationMeta>
<runtimeQueryMeta>
<parameters>
<parameter>AccessID</parameter>
</parameters>
<returnTypes>
<returnType>Double0To1</returnType>
<returnType>Description</returnType>
</returnTypes>
</runtimeQueryMeta>
</module>
Figure 7.8: Registration XML for the Notes and Orders module.
• Issue a query for all diagnoses for this user.
• For each diagnosis, query for how many patients with that diagnosis are are in the entire access log.
• Query for how many patients are accessed by that role in total.
• Combine the last two values into a probability, i.e. find how likely a role is to access that diagnosis.
• If the resulting probability is greater than some threshhold, report it to the user.
Note that this module could easily be also implemented as an anomaly-detection module by using the
reported probabilities to determine an anomaly score. The registration XML for this module is available in
7.9.
7.3.3 CADS
The CADS module is by far the most complex of the three modules implemented so far. CADS requires a
considerable amount of preprocessing time in order to run on the entire access log, regardless of the k value
it is given. It also requires persistent storage on the machine on which it is implemented. There are also a
number of ways in which to use the results that it returns to assign anomaly scores.
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<module>
<name>Explain Positions</name>
<class>seclab.aod.module.PositionExplainer</class>
<location>/PositionExplainer.class</location>
<preprocessingMeta>
<dataFormat>DBInstance</dataFormat>
</preprocessingMeta>
<initializationMeta>
<parameters>
<parameter>PatientID</parameter>
</parameters>
</initializationMeta>
<runtimeQueryMeta>
<parameters>
<parameter>UserId</parameter>
</parameters>
<returnTypes>
<returnType>Description</returnType>
</returnTypes>
</runtimeQueryMeta>
</module>
Figure 7.9: Registration XML for the Position Explainer module.
select e.patient_id, a.user_id from encounter e
inner join access a on e.enc_uniq_id = a.enc_uniq_id
order by a.user_access_dttm
Figure 7.10: SQL query issued to construct the entire access log for CADS
38
The CADS code itself was implemented in the R programming language by the authors of [7]. Executing
the CADS module therefore requires the R environment to be installed and configured on the server. When
the preprocessing stage is reached, the CADS module retrieves a stripped-down form of the access log for
processing. The input to the CADS R code is a series of three vectors in a specific format. Each vector
is length N where N is the number of distinct accesses in the access log. The first vector represents the
users, the second is the patients, and the third are the number of times the ith user accessed the ith patient’s
record. The values in the user and patient vectors are simply unique identifiers which are sequential between
1 and the maximum number of users or patients, respectively.
The access log is gathered by executing the SQL query in Figure 7.10 with optional limitations such as
setting the maximum number of records retrieved or setting the start and end dates and times. Once the
patient and user identifiers are gathered, they are then mapped to sequential values beginning at 1 and saved
to disk. The CADS module then constructs the R code from the script source and tells R to load each of
the values from disk and execute the CADS script. The output is published to an XML file in a temporary
directory and read back in through Java.
Once the CADS scores are generated, there are two options currently implemented in the CADS module
for converting these scores to anomaly values. The first approach is to divide the scores into percentiles
of some given size and take the topmost partition based on that percentile. With this approach you are
guaranteed to get the top p% of scores for a given percentile p. The better approach, which is the default,
is to calculate the standard deviation and mean on the deviations returned by CADS and assign anomaly
scores to users based on their distance from the mean. Both of these approaches are performed by inserting
R code into the script and having R execute the statistical analysis, rather than implementing it in Java.
The current implementation of the CADS module using a k value of 10 and a 100,000 record subset
of the entire access log. It uses the normal distribution method for determining anomalous users with a 2
standard deviation threshold. When it finds a user having a CADS score 2 standard deviations away from
the mean, it assigns a color to that user based on the z-score. This way, users who are further from the mean
will appear a deeper red than those who are closer to the mean. All users who fall within the 2 standard
deviation threshold are not colored.
The CADS module also produces a description of the coloring for all users who lie outside of the threshold,
which alert the front-end user to the reason why the user was colored red.
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<module>
<name>CADS</name>
<class>seclab.aod.module.CADSModule</class>
<location>/CADSModule.class</location>
<preprocessingMeta>
<dataFormat>DBInstance</dataFormat>
</preprocessingMeta>
<initializationMeta>
<parameters>
<parameter>PatientID</parameter>
</parameters>
</initializationMeta>
<runtimeQueryMeta>
<parameters>
<parameter>UserID</parameter>
</parameters>
<returnTypes>
<returnType>Double0To1</returnType>
<returnType>Description</returnType>
</returnTypes>
</runtimeQueryMeta>
</module>
Figure 7.11: Registration XML for the CADS module.
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Chapter 8
Demonstration and Use Case
This chapter will present an example scenario in which MAI is utilized by both a patient and administrators.
We hope to demonstrate the power of MAI in satisfying the requirements of patients and administrators
alike, and give a taste of what can be had once more modules are developped and MAI becomes more than
a prototype.
8.1 Patient View
Imagine that you were recently a patient in a hospital who has undergone treatment for issues related to
your internal organs. You were given the patient id of 35347and diagnoses in Table 8.1 during your five
encounters at the hospital.
You remember there being a lot of people coming in and out of your hospital room, so you become curious
to know who all these people were and why they need access to your sensitive personal information. You
know that you have the right to an access report, so you file a request with the provider, who are obligated
by law to give it to you.
The provider responds telling you to log into their MAI web page using your patient id. You log on to
the page and are greeted with the welcome screen, as in Figure 8.1.
You click on patient view and enter your patient id in the search field, which produces a list of your
accesses. In our de-identified prototype, all users have an ID rather than a name displayed. Since you
were accessed by 319 distinct users over the course of your 5 encounters, the access record is very long and
contains a large number of unfamiliar user positions, such as “UR/QA 1”.
According to the requirements of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, your record
ICD-9 Code Description
153.9 Malignant neoplasm of colon, unspecified site
197.0 Secondary malignant neoplasm of lung
197.7 Secondary malignant neoplasm of liver
Table 8.1: Summary of the diagnoses for patient 35347
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Figure 8.1: The MAI welcome page
displays the date and time of access, the name of the users who made the access, and the user’s role which
is used in lieu of a reason or action taken on the data.
Additionally there is a button reading “Explain Positions” at the top of the page. When you press it,
each user has a small question mark icon next to their name. When you hover over the icon for the user
with position UR/QA 1, a tool-tip text appears reading,
This role has a 80.0% chance of accessing your diagnosis, 197.0
This role has a 82.0% chance of accessing your diagnosis, 153.9
This role has a 93.8% chance of accessing your diagnosis, 197.7
An example of this functionality is seen in Figure 8.2.
You begin to feel a lot better about seeing strange positions that you previously weren’t aware of.
However, since you had so many accesses to your record, you decide to call your healthcare provider and
demand that they audit your record for any anomalous behavior.
8.2 Administrator View
The security administrator at your provider receives your request for an audit and proceeds to check your
record through the MAI system. When she logs in with your patient id, she sees the same access log that
you did when you logged in. However, she has several modules available to her that you did not have access
to. In this demonstration, these are the Notes and Orders module and the CADS module. A screenshot of
the administrator page can be found in Figure 8.3.
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Figure 8.2: The PositionExplainer module at work
Figure 8.3: The MAI administrator display page
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Figure 8.4: A lightly-colored user affected by the CADS module
The administrator begins examining the record by selecting the CADS module, which colors a few users
in various shades of red and places a question mark icon next to the names of those users. The administrator
hovers her mouse over the icon for user 6679, who is shaded in a faint red, like in Figure 8.4. The tool-tip
text appears, displaying
User 6679 has a high social network-derived score
which indicates that CADS has deemed user 6679 suspicious based on its configuration parameters. She
decides that there is no need for alarm yet, since the CADS module was configured to begin shading users
red when their deviations are outside of two standard deviations from the mean. She continues searching
for users who have a higher alert level.
Before long, she discovers user 6736, who has a significantly deeper red color than the previous user, as
seen in Figure 8.5. She begins to get suspicious of this user, so she enables the Notes and Orders module,
which colors a large number of the accesses green, indicating that they are not likely to be suspicious.
User 6736 also has a number of his or her accesses turn green at that point, but the red color enabled
by CADS remains. She also enables the Position Explainer module which gives statistics about the user-
diagnosis relationship, as in Figure 8.6. The Position Explainer module says that the greatest chance of user
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Figure 8.5: A darkly-colored user affected by the CADS module
6736’s role accessing a patient with this diagnosis is 75%. This means that users with the same role as user
6736 accessed patients having one of the same diagnoses as the patient 3 times out of 4. Since one of the
accesses is colored green it is quite possible that the user is doing legitimate work, but he or she also makes
several accesses that are not accompanied by notes or orders. The administrator decides that she should
probably take a look into the accesses made by user 6736 to other patients to see if any other suspicious
behavior sticks out.
8.3 Use Case Discussion
By utilizing the MAI framework and its ever-growing collection of analytical modules, the hospital was able
to save a great deal of time, money, and talent in order to comply with the regulations of the Department
of Health and Human services. In this example, the MAI system offered the following benefits:
• First, the MAI system automatically compiles an access record ready for presentation to the patient
which eliminates time spent generating the data by specialists.
• Secondly, the patient is presented with options for explaining the accesses that are made to his or her
45
Figure 8.6: A combination of CADS, Notes and Orders, and Position Explainer modules
record. This behavior is likely to prevent patients from becoming confused by, or concerned about,
who makes accesses to their record.
• Thirdly, a significant amount of manpower was saved in replying to a patient’s request for an audit by
leveraging existing anomaly detection techniques in a user-friendly way. Although providers are not
required to respond to patient audit requests, doing so is good for keeping the patient satisfied and
ensuring the patient returns to the same provider. Furthermore, it has the potential to save on legal
liabilities if a HIPAA violation is discovered.
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Chapter 9
Discussion
In this text we have outlined the need for an extensible system capable of analyzing access log data in
an electronic health record environment and explored the reality of building such a system. Due to the
nature of the legal and regulatory systems surrounding the United States healthcare industry, it has become
necessary to build a system like MAI in order to satisfy the needs of patients and healthcare providers alike.
MAI was designed with the goal in mind of easing the burden of implementation of these regulations while
simultaneously leveraging the wealth of technical knowledge available in the academic literature.
9.1 Affects on Healthcare Information Technology
We hope that this study reinforces the notion that implementation of the access report requirements in
the Department of Health and Human Services’ Notice of Proposed Rulemaking are quite tractable. When
the Office of Civil Rights called for comments on the NPRM from stakeholders, it was largely endorsed
and applauded for its advancement of patient rights [26][25][4]. However, these same sources were doubtful
about the capabilities of healthcare organizations to produce the access reports due to the administrative
overhead required as well as the cost of implementation. We have demonstrated that compiling the access
reports in a user-friendly manner is tractable in real-time for an audit log of over six million entries, and we
have demonstrated that the state of the art is sufficiently advanced to go further than the requirements of
the NPRM in extracting explanations for these accesses. Our prototype allows patients and administrators
to be able to easily obtain information and make judgements about a complex system without the need to
understand the implementation details.
The access records that HHS has called for are a valuable step toward giving patients control over the
data contained within their health records. We would like to see technology driving the way to progress the
way it has been demonstrated in the HITECH bill and we hope that this work stimulates more work in that
direction.
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9.2 Limitations and Future Work
We believe that MAI is sufficiently extensible to facilitate new detection algorithms in the future which
discover more data types than simply an anomaly score or a description text. We also see great potential in
the flexibility of the Module API for allowing new modules to be developed in emerging technologies.
The prototype described in these pages is fairly limited in its power to address the concerns of its users,
mostly due to the lack of analytical modules that are implemented so far. Furthermore, there is a much
broader limitation to this project which lies in the inherent complexity of EHR systems and our lack of
understanding of it. There are no perfect algorithms for understanding the accesses that are made to a
patient’s record and the anomaly detection tools that are developped by the machine learning community
are always somewhat handicapped by a trade-off between sensitivity and specificity.
We already have two other modules being implemented in the MAI system which will further improve
its analytical capabilities. The first, called PFADS, analyzes the flow of patients through an organization
according to the access records and constructs a model for a typical patient of that type [30]. A new patient
can then be compared to the existing patient flows and if an access deviates from the expected model, that
access can be flagged as anomalous. The second module in development, SNAD, constructs a social network
similar to that in CADS but performs better at deeming specific actions as anomalous, rather than aggregate
behavior like CADS [8].
We also have plans to include more information for the Patient View, such as utilizing social networks
for the opposite purpose as in CADS. Rather than detecting when a user is anomalous within a community,
we could use these networks to defined when a user is considered normal within his or her network based on
criteria such as who he or she works with. If a patient regularly interacts with User A and User A regularly
works with User B, it should not necessarily be suspicious if User B accesses the patient’s record even if it
is unusual for his role.
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Appendix A
Database Schema
A.1 Schema Diagram
Figure A.1: Entity Relationship Diagram
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A.2 Table Descriptions
access
Field Type Reference Description
access id int(10) UN PK AI Primary Key
enc uniq id int(10) UN encounter Reference to the encounter of
this access
pat loc id int(10) UN location Reference to the location within
the hospital
patient service id int(10) UN patient service Reference to the patient’s ser-
vice ID
user id int(10) UN user Reference to the user making
the access
reason id int(10) UN reason Reference to the user-supplied
reason
user access dttm datetime Date and time of access
user note cnt int(11) Number of notes accessed
user order cnt int(11) Number of orders accessed
department
Field Type Reference Description
dept id int(10) UN PK AI Primary Key
dept desc text Name of the department
encounter
Each access belongs to an encounter, which is essentially a patient’s time at the hospital from check-in until discharge.
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Field Type Reference Description
enc uniq id int(10) UN PK AI Primary Key
patient id int(10) UN patient Reference to the patient for this
encounter.
enc end dttm datetime The end date and time of the
encounter.
enc id int(10) UN The encounter pseudonym gen-
erated by NMH
enc start dttm datetime The start date and time of the
encounter.
icd9 data
This table encapsulates an ICD-9 code. The code and type together form the primary key.
Field Type Reference Description
code varchar(45) PK The ICD-9 code itself
type varchar(45) PK Either diagnosis or procedure
desc text A textual description of the code
icd9 grouping
This table handles the hierarchical structure of the ICD-9 codes.
Field Type Reference Description
parent id int(10) UN icd9 grouping The higher-level ICD-9 code.
grouping id int(10) UN PK AI Primary Key
first code varchar(45) For higher-level groups, the
starting code
last code varchar(45) icd9 data For higher-level groups, the end-
ing code
desc text
location
This table holds the locations within NMH.
Field Type Reference Description
loc desc text The name of the location
loc id int(10) UN PK AI Primary Key
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patient
This table encapsulates all the relevant patient information available in the de-identified data set.
Field Type Reference Description
pat zip int(10) UN ZIP code, de-identified to the
first three digits.
pat age int(10) The patient’s age
pat pseudonym double UN The original NMH patient
pseudonym
patient id int(10) UN PK AI Primary Key
patient service
This table holds the services into which a patient can be placed. Examples include “Hematology” and “Transplant
Surgery.”
Field Type Reference Description
patient service desc text The textual description, as
above
patient service id int(10) UN PK AI Primary Key
problem
Field Type Reference Description
diag dttm datetime The date and time of diagnosis
prob id int(10) UN PK AI Primary Key
icd9 code varchar(45) icd9 data The ICD-9 code for this problem
patient id int(10) UN patient The patient affected by the problem
reason
A reason for access, usually closely resembling the user role.
Field Type Reference Description
reason id int(10) UN PK AI Primary Key
reason desc text Textual description of the reason
role
Field Type Reference Description
role desc text Name of the role
role id int(10) UN PK AI Primary Key
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user
Field Type Reference Description
user pseudonym int(10) UN Original NMH user pseudonym
user id int(10) UN PK AI Primary Key
role id int(10) UN role A reference to the user’s role
user dept list
Maintains a list of departments for each user.
Field Type Reference Description
dept id int(10) UN department The department linked to the user
user id int(10) UN user The user belonging to the department
dept list id int(10) UN PK AI Primary Key
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